

UDC 930.2:[355.48-025.26:327]:(470+571):(477)“2014/2017”

Kucheruk M.S.,

candidate of historical sciences, associate professor Odessa National Polytechnic University, kucheruk@opu.ua

Ukraine, Odessa

## THE EXPEDIENCY OF STUDYING AND APPLYING HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND THE DOCTRINE OF SUN TZU IN MANAGING THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION

*Hybrid war is considered as a new type of war. But, do we really have to think so? Analyzing the actions of the Russian Federation directed against Ukraine in 2014-2017, it was noticed that our rival was using the recipes that Sun Tzu had advised. As we know the treatise “The Art of War” was written more than 2000 years ago. If someone decomposes the history of Eastern Europe, he will deduce that Russia has always applied the same means. It does not matter when it happened – a year ago or two hundred years ago. Also, Russian governance resorted to political intrigue, economic pressure, cultural influences and military methods as well. Throughout the Russian empire, the strategy of the Russians remains the same – the expansion of spheres of influence and the annexation of new territories. The tactics were dependent on circumstances. Both the learning of the history of Eastern Europe and analysis of “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu can help with dealing with the Russian menace.*

**Key words:** war; hybrid war; Ukraine; Russian Federation.

“All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near. Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him under a strain and wear him down. When he is united, divide him. Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you.” [73, C.66-71].

**The statement of a problem.** These words were written by Sun Tzu, the most prominent author who ever put about war. Traditionally the substantiation of the relevance of the topic under study must be noticed at the beginning of an article with. But “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu sounds better. We were attacked by surprise. Ukraine underwent the unprecedented cynical offensive by those whom we considered our friends. While the war continues, we face the feasibility of the study and apply the theoretical writings of the military experts. It is always clear that the patriotism is a good thing and the occupation is bad one. We need more than just a apprehension. There should be the answer to the question: how to deal with it? Knowledge plays a big role.

“Therefore I say: “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril” [73, C.84].

Cambridge International Dictionary of English provides us with the interpretation with the concept: “war – armed fighting between two or more countries or groups, or a particular example of this” [69, C.1636]. Great Explanatory Dictionary of the Modern Ukrainian Language gives the similar meaning: “war – organized armed struggle between states, social classes etc.” [11, C.145].

At last but not at least Carl von Clausewitz assures us that “War is only a continuation of State policy by other means” [70, C. xxiii]. Carl von Clausewitz writes about the purpose of the war: “The two kinds of War are, first, those in which the object is the overthrow of the enemy, whether it be that we aim at his destruction, politically, or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and next those in which our object is merely to take some conquests on the frontiers of his country, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently, or of turning them to account as matter of exchange in the settlement of a peace” [70, C. xxxiii]. As well, the political object comes first: “...the political object as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made” [70, C.70].

**The purpose of the article.** This statement is worthy a special attention. Every war that took place in history, was guided primarily by political goals. At least, this is evidenced by the backward of Eastern Europe. Hybrid war is not exception but it has an essential difference. If earlier the war was carried out for the seizure of the territories, nowadays the war is waging for seizure of human minds.

**The statement of the main material.** Let's get back to Sun Tzu. His time life is defined by biography given in historian Sima Qian's work. Soviet Orientalist Nikolai Konrad set the era of Sun Tzu life – it was at the end of Chunchu era (770-403 a. d.). Sun Tzu itself served the ruler of U Kingdom Kho-lyuy as a general and had achieved significant success at this post. He devastated Chu Kingdom and captured its capital In; also Sun Tzu defeated Kingdoms Tsi and Tzin. It was Sun Tzu whom U Kingdom had to be beholden for gaining its strength and leveling its position among the other kingdoms of Ancient China [64, C.15].

We have to mark “The Art of War” treatise for its versatility of application. A lot of its hints go beyond the warfare. Sun Tzu's universal tips can be used anywhere, especially when it comes to policy and administration. “The

Art of War” by Sun Tzu can be extremely useful in confronting Russian Federation. For all its history Russia absorbed various cultural elements, European and Asiatic as well. Actually, the Russians are semi-Asiatic nation. They have European look and Asiatic outlook. The lack of the understanding of this fact always made Western governments step on the same rake in Russian affairs. Dealing with the Russians, the Europeans estimated Russia to be the part of West. All the times they suffered from Russian tricks. No wonder that the Russians consider as their totem animal a polar bear – the most cunning predator on the Earth. Russian political culture is close to Asia. We are far from judging who is good and who is bad. Every nation is unique. There is no room for speculations over tolerance also. The matter of fact that the Western nations and the Russian nation are different.

Presumably, “The Art of War” treatise appeared on the territory of Moscow Principality in times of the Tatar-Mongol. Perhaps, the adoption of the “Third Rome” concept gave the Moscow statesmen impetus to active use of Sun Tzu doctrine in their international policy. It's well known that Moscow never scanted neither resources nor soldiers for seizure new territories. In this policy were used methods close to the Sun Tzu's ones. The long duration of the Russian influence, its persistence and various tactics suggests the presence of a holistic concept and a detailed plan of conquest.

Moscow Principality has always been seen as a descendant of the Tatar-Mongol State. For instance, Karl Marx in his emotional manner wrote: “... modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy.

*The Tartar yoke lasted from 1237 to 1462 – more than two centuries; a yoke not only crushing, but dishonoring and withering the very soul of the people that fell its prey. The Mongol Tartars established a rule of systematic terror, devastation and wholesale massacre forming its institutions. Their numbers being scanty in proportion to their enormous conquests, they wanted to magnify them by a halo of consternation, and to thin, by wholesale slaughter, the populations which might rise in their rear... The Tartar yoke had already lasted a hundred years before Muscovy emerged from its obscurity. To entertain discord among the Russian princes, and secure their servile submission, the Mongols had restored the dignity of the Grand Princedom. ... It was in this infamous strife that the Moscow branch won at last the race. In 1238 the crown of the Grand Princedom, wrested from the branch of Tver by dint of denunciation and assassination, was picked up at the feet of Usbeck Khan by Yury, the elder brother by Ivan Kalita. Uvan I Kalita, and Ivan III surnamed the Great, personate Muscovy, rising by means of the Tartar yoke, and Muscovy getting an independent power by the disappearance of the Tartar rule” [72, C.77-78].*

Although not so emotionally shaped but the same in essence Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin put the similar: “History does not tolerate optimism and must not seek testimonies in the occurrences that all what had happened was for the best: because such a sophistication is not peculiar to common human common sense for which it was written. The Baty invasion, pile of ashes and corpses, captivity, so last-long slavery, of course, make up one of the greatest calamities we know about from the State chronicles; however, also its

*salutary effects are undeniable. Better, if someone of Yaroslav descendants would prevented this disaster by restoring the monarchy in Russia and, due to intrinsic rules of the Autocracy, ensured external security and inner peace: but there weren't for two hundred years. Possibly, Princely internecine wars would last for another hundred years or more: but what the conclusion would they had? Likely, our Motherland would fall: Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Sweden would tear it apart; in this case we should lose the state being and Faith, which were sawed by Moscow; but its greatness Moscow owes to the Khans” [33, C.496].*

Such appeal to the past one might see as a needless one. In fact historic background has a great importance for Russian governments. Manipulation with history occupy a prominent place among the means of conducting a hybrid war.

Daniel T. Lasica writes that hybrid war includes three elements. First, hybrid war “is mean to attack American weakness at all levels with complex threats, in multiple domains, while avoiding American strengths” [71, C.17]. Second, “hybrid war threats constitute an elusive and fluid form” [71, C.21]. Third, “the last element that characterizes hybrid war is true full spectrum warfare capabilities” [71, C.22].

Yury Radkovets points out that “hybrid war goes beyond the frames of traditional concept and gets combined core, turning into tangle political intrigues, struggle for political and economical domination over the territory, resources and financial flows” [55, C.36]. Analyzing Russia's actions in Ukraine, he refers to Sun Tzu: “For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill” [73, C.77].

A. Ivashchenko and N. Schpura note that the strategies of hybrid conflict were being developed simultaneously in the USA and in Russia at the beginning of the new century. In recent years hybrid conflicts started in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Georgia and Ukraine. Therewith, there is still no the only clear definition of concept “hybrid threat”, the system views on systematic preparations and dealing of such a conflict are absent, there is no anti-hybrid warfare scenario [22, C.18].

Further, number of facts will be presented, well-known historical events and nowadays news will appear. The sources are easy to find. They are books, journals, newspapers and internet resources. Nothing absolutely new but vision. History of Ukraine and European history, political analysis and news from the front are listed together with Sun Tzu quotations. This research paper is a synthetic one.

If one just look over the news that appear in the media, they are facing just as a range of occasions with any conjunction. But united news and events show us coherent canvas. It's like a children game called puzzle. Isolated items tells us nothing. But the picture emerges when we are starting to unite the elements with each other. The facts play the analogous role for us. United historical occasions and modern occurrences introduce us the Russian methods of hybrid war.

The mysterious Russian soul... What is it striving for?

Having refused the modernization and westernization ideas, Russia turned to the new imperial project. Even if there were some hopes on Dmitry Medvedev, who might be seemed as a liberal, the Putin's return threw them all away.

From the very moment of his comeback, Vladimir Putin dreamed of returning the past power of Russia. Mr Putin is still nostalgic for the Soviet Union and believes that its breakup was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century. And he has got a significant support. In fact, a lot of Russians also think so.

Let's note that such aggressive plans were not even concealed from the word community. Strategy of National Security of Russian Federation until 2020, adopted 2009, declared that oriented to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization global and regional architecture was invalid; also it contained the claim that Russia had sufficient resources for its consolidation among world economic leaders [36, C.22]. During the election campaign-2011 the article "New Integration Project for Eurasia – the Future that born today" was published in the newspaper "Izvestija". Vladimir Putin outlined his plans for the future cadence there. He emphasized that the final plan war in integration of the European Union, the Eurasian Union and the Asia-Pacific Region with the aim of crowding out American influence and weakening of Transatlantic institutes [22, C.22-23].

The updated concept of Russian foreign policy clearly declared the goal of reintegration of CIS countries under Moscow auspices. Ukraine was given a special role. It was rated as the priority Russian partner in the CIS and should have been connected to in-depth integration process. Russian vis-a-vis were outspokening with all frankness about the inadmissibility of geopolitical pluralism in the region. In this manner Putin started the process of construction of a new political union under his leadership [32]. Russian President conducted an active offensive policy directed to all-round reunion of post-Soviet space. Gas transit issues, energy prices and base of the Black Sea Fleet of the Crimea were only its instruments and elements of respective rhetoric [56, C.9].

This policy got support from pro-Russian oriented Western experts who in Realpolitik traditions called for "don't irritate Russia" and consideration of Russian "vital interests". Significant financial support made the word sympathize with Russia and its interest while the East-European nations' voice fell in the deaf ear. Ukrainian writer and publicist Mykola Riabchuk asked:

*"... Eastern Europeans also have "vital interests", moreover exactly Russia have always been and is the real threat for them, and not vice versa. ... But why all round must accept this strange mix of mania of grandeur and pursuit mania? Why Western Europeans must stand for this manias and Eastern Europeans must comply them?"* [56, C.10].

Russia had resolutely went away from democracy and moved towards fascism. Undemocratic and unsocialist political system, hypernationalist state ideology, hypermasculine cult of the leader and admired population support pointed to it. In his interview with the magazine "Time" (2007) Mr Putin openly expressed his doubts about Ukraine's sovereignty. Alike Russian politics repeatedly demanded the return of the Crimea to Russia, pronounced about discrimination of Russia minority in Ukraine and told that the Ukrainian state was close to collapse [56, C.11].

John E. Herbst, director of the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, remarked that Kremlin aggressive politic became evident in 2005, when Putin had started gas war against Ukraine. But now it's more aggressive and more

dangerous. In march 2013 Putin fell to hybrid war against Ukraine. Besides, this war was his second one, after aggression in Georgia 2008 [17, C.28].

Minsk negotiations were supposed as a means of stopping the war. But it failed. All that the partners could reach was the cease fire regime. 'There are no good news', said President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko February, 15, 2015 [13, C.12]. And there was a preliminary agreement on the withdrawal of heavy weapons. But Russia was still proceeding in holding the frontiers open and dispatching the fighters to the territory of Ukraine. Military trainings close to Ukrainian borders were also going on.

Putin perceived Kiev Euromaidan as a threat to his power. Writer A. Prokhanov, who supports Russian aggression in Ukraine, compares European civilization with a magnet, that attracts Kiev and Moscow. For it's resistance, the destabilization of Ukraine and neutralization of the magnet itself [13, C.12-13] are required.

The European Union and the NATO are considered expansionists in Russia. Putin feels danger. He believes that the United States has occupied Europe by using Western values, and they were proceeding to use them for gaining power over the world. He said in 2015 that the USA *"strive for cementing the regime formed after USSR breakup and stay as undeniable leader. They presume that can do whatever they like while the others are restricted by this leader's interests. Maybe, someone would like to live in a half-occupied state, but it's not us"* [13, C.13].

Prof. Jonathan Holslag regards that Crimean annexation and invasion of Eastern Ukraine have put in jeopardy some of the main principles of international policy. They made the idea of the immutability of sovereignty of the country a questionable fact. Both, the principle of multilateral negotiations as key in solving problems is undermined [27, C.30]. The old rules of international policy are blown up.

Supra, there was a talk about three element of hybrid war. Ukrainian historical experience convinces us that the fourth element exists in Russia – this is cultural influence. The "Russian Word" concept is the extremely powerful means of influence. This is the weapon that slays the human soul, and Russian recipe of subduing the enemy without fighting. Of course, hybrid war 2014 was expected by specialists and scholars. But common people were much surprised. Despite the fact that knowledgeable people in Ukraine warned about Russian aggression and repeatedly were speaking in the media for more than twenty years, the population perceived them as something like "city crazies". Why was so? Because the imperial ideology and massive propaganda, these essential elements of the "Russian Word", brought up a really loyal to Russia generation.

Confrontation between Russia and the West lasts for a long time. Since the nascence of the state, Russia asserted itself as alternative to the West. In the 15<sup>th</sup> and the 16<sup>th</sup> centuries, relying on the "Third Rome" concept, Russia declared itself as the descendant of Byzantium. Thus, Russian politics assigned their country as the center of the world Orthodox Church, and the religious confrontation with Catholicism and Protestantism with concomitant phenomenon of super-high level of religious intolerance were its consequences [43, C.40].

---

The attempts of westernization took place during the reign of Peter I. Then Russia borrowed some elements of European culture, but to a large extent the changes had only a frontage character. Mostly, anti-legal mentality is displaying in folk proverbs: “*I am captain – you are fool*” or “*Is right that one, who has more rights*” [43, C.40].

The most pronounced anti-Western sentiment are contained in Slavophile and Eurasian ideas. The Slavophiles believed that the Russians and the Europeans were the “dissonant” people. Also they wrote about non-European path for Russia and its non-European uniqueness. In turn, the Eurasians asserted that Russia was the fundamentally original civilization. Catholic church, Enlightenment and Liberalism were perceived by the Eurasians with great hostility. Later they drifted to the side of Soviet communism and voiced their hate to “damn bourgeois West” [43, C.41].

Now, anti-Western policy is not gowned Communist cloak, but the imperial and even ecclesiastic ones. “*We see how much Euro-Atlantic countries are neglecting their roots in fact and Christian values in particular*”, said Mr Putin in 2013 [13, C.13]. Vice versa, Russia “*has always been a state civilization united by Russian people, Russian language, Russian culture and Russian Orthodox Church*” [13, C.13]. Pro-Russian militants are protecting Russian peculiar outlook from contaminated Western way of life in Donbass [13, C.13].

For substantiation of its “natural” license over this territory, Russia always has been enforcing its own version of history to human minds. The ultimate goal of this humanitarian policy stood in attempts to force the Ukrainians to look at themselves and their past in acceptable form for Moscow. Of course, the historical concept was worked out in Moscow. Simultaneously, the Imperial perceptions of Ukraine, the Ukrainians and Ukrainian history, were thrust to the rest of the world. From the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia was translating at the international community the imagine of Ukraine and the Ukrainians which had been interpreted through its expansionist interests. To a large extent such apprehension is carrying out till now [4, C.52].

Eva Thomson made her conclusions: “*The Muscovy, and the followed by it Russian Empire and Soviet Union inherited the Mongolian irresistible bias for concealing of political and intellectual information. Russia is accustomed to keep all in secret – not only economic and military data, but development of humanitarian studies and the world's ideas as well. That's why reflections over metropolis and periphery, which already have become a part of Western everyday intellectual discourse, are perceived as embarrassing innovations in Russia*” [19, C.14-16].

For a significant amount of time the concept of Kievan Rus as “the cradle of thee fraternal people”, with the Russian's domination of course, was set down in consciousness of the Ukrainians by methodically means and without any petition [4, C.52]. Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Braichevsky opposed this version, but his principled position turned as a career disaster for him. He was dismissed from the Academy of Sciences in 1968.

Modern Russian historians developed a concept close to traditional imperial scheme. This is the “Pun-Russian culture” conception. It denies the fact of existence of Ukrainian people and affirms that the Ukrainians have

always been the part of the Russian people. Moreover, Pereiaslav Council 1654 was welcomed by the both sides, the Ukrainian and the Moscow, as “*renovation of old unity, reunion of torn by political boundaries and divided the separate parts of Rus*” [4, C.52].

Our rival always understood the great meaningfulness of Ukrainian language and never gave up the attempts to crush it. That's why significant efforts were directed at crowding it out and substitution in Russian language as the ground of “the Russian World” promotion [12, C.13].

In July 1863 minister of the interior Peter Valuev signed a secret circular on prohibition of publication of scientific, religious and pedagogical texts in Ukrainian. Only Ukrainian works of arts were admitted. Peter Valuev said then that “*no Ukrainian language exists, it never existed and its existence is impossible*” [60, C.351]. In 1876, Alexander II issued the Ems degree. The publication and import of any Ukrainians books were banned, the Ukrainian performances in theaters forbidden, the Ukrainian songs translated into other languages, the newspaper “Kiev Telegraph” was closed, the teaching in Ukrainian any disciplines stopped, Ukrainian books withdrawn from school libraries and Ukrainian teachers dismissed [60, C.352].

This anti-Ukrainian policy reached its climax at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century when Peter Stolypin was leading the imperial government. Then the “great Russian nation” of the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belorussians project was attempted to realize. Ukrainian language was totally prohibited. Even the right to Ukrainian autonomy within the Russian Empire was disaffirmed. The Russian Empire breakup was a back-off, but not the stoppage of this russification process. The assimilation policy was renovated in the early 1930-s. This conception ideology based on voluntary concept of all the people of the Soviet Union amalgamation into the new only Russian-speaking social community [8, C.14-15]. The Soviet authorities claimed that the new historical community of the Soviet people was forming then. Dissident Ivan Dzuba write an article with an eloquent title “Internationalism or Russification?” on it.

The Soviet history has been rewritten in modern Russia pursuing the goal of demonstration of its Imperial succession. Tetyana Zhurzhenko concludes that “*in recent years such a perception of Soviet past has become a part of ideological paradigm of “sovereign democracy” that denied the versatility of Western model of democracy and legitimized the Russian “special path*” [20, C.12].

On the question about the European mistakes the ex-president of Latvia Vaira Vike-Freiberga answered: “*after the Soviet Union breakup the West had too romantic looks on Russia*” [7, C.11].

Sun Tzu wrote: “*Thus a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning*” [73, C.87]. So, what the secret of the Russian victories? It lies in the fact that the ground for defeating the rivals and acquiring new territories always had been prepared much earlier – for many years, even decades. Now we can dare to suppose that the sentence “*a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle*” can explain the core of the hybrid war. Thus, in Russian foreign policy the offensive troops in most cases was going after political intrigue, economic pressure and propaganda.

The example we can see in modern Kazakhstan case. Kazakh journalist Serik Malev in his article "Steep front" says that the Kremlin conducts unpronounced war against Kazakhstan. The informational component takes a special place among the others methods. A lot set of anti-Kazakh, invented in Soviet times, stereotypes and cliches is applying [47, C.20]. Serik Malev designates main of them.

Myth 1. If the Russian leaves, the Kazakh economy will collapse. Myth 2. The Russians were cruelly harassed and the Russian-speaking citizens were restricted in their rights. That's why a lot of people fled in the 1990-s. Myth 3. Kazakh state never existed [47, C.20-21].

All these myths have refutations. First: there were not outdated Soviet factories that helped to deal with long-lasting economic crisis. The work of millions of Kazakhs, Western investment and advanced technologies did it. Second: the real reason for emigration in the 1990-s was the economic crisis, not the xenophobia. Third: what about the Golden Horde? [47, C.20-21]

The same myths Russia is overspreading in regard to Ukraine, too. So, can we speak about new methods of war? Seems, these means of warfare are as old, as the Russian state itself. Unlike the previous wars against Ukraine, this one is a word famous one. Globalization and informational revolution have favored it. We can't say that informational revolution changed the world. Politics and mankind are the same as that hundreds of years ago. But what has the informational revolution really did, that it made the world visible. Previously, political processes were taking place in castles and palaces and concerned only a small proportion of the population, inaccessible for the rest. Common people faced only the outcomes. Now, using Internet, everyone can find out almost everything he or she want.

In a hybrid war history becomes an applied science. Now it's time to analyze the Sun Tzu quotation put at the opening of this paper.

*"All warfare is based on deception."* There was a tragic page of Ukrainian history of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that fits the best for the interpretation of this sentence. This event was the real demonstration of policy that Bolsheviks were leading against Ukraine and the biggest Ukrainian tragedy. It is the Great Famine, 1932-33, also called Holodomor.

James Mace pointed that Stalin was waging unclaimed war against the Ukrainians, and all its military, constabulary, political and economical arsenal were involved in it [16, C.48]. The other historian, Robert Conquest wrote about Holodomor in times when the scholars that shared the opinion that that the Communism was an awesome, unjust and unbelievably cruel system, were the minority [1, C.50]. His book "Harvest of Sorrow" revealed the organized by Soviet authorities the artificial famine. When Soviet archives became undisclosed, these investigations have got their confirmation.

Ukraine was extremely important for Stalin's plans of industrialization. But construction of large enterprises was impossible without widespread collectivization. The Soviet plans of development of industry were based on assumption that the state would buy grain from the peasant cheaply. It would be the possibility of providing the increasing workforce with food and selling bread-stuff abroad, in turn the profits from it would be directed on industrialization

sponsorship. But peasants considered the price proposed by the state as too low and refused to sell the corn. Indeed, they were right, as the proposed by the authorities prices mostly were only the one eighth from the market price. As result, the grazing crisis outburst in 1927-1928.

Thereafter, Joseph Stalin started squeezing the villagers to enter kolkhoses. Having counted rich peasants as the enemies of the Soviet state, Joseph Stalin directed the efforts on liquidation of this social stratum. A lot of people were expropriated. This policy reached its apogee in winter, 1929-1930, and the most common form of it was the deportation to Siberia.

The excessively high requisitions were put on the village. Plans for grain requirement were too high. If there was the amount of corn lack, Joseph Stalin activists got prescript to confiscate it all, including seed fund and peasant's personal feed. Ukrainian historian Orest Subtelny noted that the number of victims of the Holodomor was varies from three to six million of people [60, C.510].

Such a rural policy in the Soviet Union was accompanied by total lie. Bolsheviks deceived their own citizens, and they are the same managed to cheat the world.

In January 1933 Joseph Stalin declared on tribune of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b): *"We definitely achieved that workers' and peasants' financial position are being improved from year to year. Only the obstinate enemies of the Soviet power can doubt it"* [38, C.42].

In turn, the foreign tourist in the Soviet Union were shown the carefully prepared excursions of idyllic life. And, after returning home, the West citizens of course were telling all that they have seen. For instance, Bernard Shaw and Edward Herriot were recounting about Soviet achievements and happy villagers with admiration [60, C.511].

So, Joseph Stalin told that there was no famine in Ukraine.

In 2014 Russia occupied Crimea. February 23, pro-Russian organizations have driven their adherents on demonstrations. The referendum of joining to Russia was their main demand. Such an act took place in Kerch, Simferopol and Feodosiya [67, C.26].

Ukrainian activist in Crimea Oleksiy Shubin witnesses that blocking and hijacking of Ukrainian military bases started February, 27 [51, C.22]. Well-known referendum took place on March 16.

Russian president Vladimir Putin, foreign minister Sergey Lavrov and minister of defense Sergey Shoigu declared that armed people, who were blocking Ukrainian military and state buildings in Crimea, did not belong to the personnel of the armed forces of the Russian Federation [10, C.7].

Russian army is acting in Ukrainian East. At first, Russian Special Forces learned the separatists tactics and handing complex weapons. But, when Ukrainian troops succeed in summer, 2014, the regular army of Russia, dislocated along the border, provided a secret support to pro-Russian militants [13, C.14]. Morning of August 24<sup>th</sup> the Russian troops directly came into battle with the Ukrainian forces at the territory of Ukraine [62, C.12]. Ten Russian paratroopers were captured in August 25<sup>th</sup> near village Dzerkalne in Donetsk region. Later they told that the preparation for invasion started from August 17<sup>th</sup> [62, C.12].

About four thousand of Russian soldiers were sent in Donbass in 2014. In 2015 Ukrainian military intelligence

---

said that the probable quantity of Russian soldiers in Donbass counted 9,000 and 50,000 were dislocated along the border from the Russian side [13, C.14].

Russian foreign ministry Sergey Lavrov pronounced that there were no Russian troops and Russian weapons in Donbass [39].

*"Therefore, when capable, feign incapacity; when active, inactivity"*. The Kremlin it denies, but to NATO is believed, that it was the Russian hacker attack on Estonia in 2007 [45].

February 15, 2007, the Estonian parliament adopted the law "On the elimination of forbidden buildings". The monument to a Soviet soldier, the "Bronze soldier" called also Alyosha, was included to the list of forbidden buildings. April 26, the carry-over of the "Bronze soldier" and excavation of brotherly grave of Soviet soldiers were started in Tallinn. But activists of "Night Watch" movement, citizens of Tallinn and the other Estonian cities tried to intervene it. In the evening of April 26<sup>th</sup> the clashes between activists and the police happened. When the crowd started to surge, tear gas and light grenades were taken by policemen. The demonstrators were throwing stone into police. As result, 44 persons injured. In the morning of April 27<sup>th</sup> the monument was removed. Russian State Duma Committee on international affairs put forward the government demand of taking measures in trade and economic relations with Estonia instantly. The committee members proposed to stop coal exports, fish and dairy products import as well. *'There are no excuses to this blasphemy'*, said Sergey Lavrov. At the one time, youth movements in Russia started the siege of embassy of Estonia, and the most aggressive turned the pro-Putin organizations ("Ours", "Young Russia") [23].

The Cyberattack on Estonia was named the "First Internet-war" by the experts in computer security [45]. This onrush was the one of the most devastating. A lot of analysts believe that the Russians did it for revenge on transference of the "Bronze Soldier". Websites of the biggest Estonian banks, government websites and new-portals were hacked. Also bank cards and mobile phones failed to work. Russia denied its involvement in attack [63].

June 27<sup>th</sup>, 2017, virus Petya.A assaulted IT systems of some countries of the world, but most of all it stroke Ukraine. The computers of oil, energy, telecommunication and pharmaceuticals companies also websites of state institutions were assailed [50]. The losses of this cyberattack were estimated in \$ 8 billion. In the Security service of Ukraine (SBU) believe that special services of Russia are concerned. Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko suspects Russia in this act of aggression, too [59].

And now it will be appropriate to mention about the other instrument of Russian policy, the extremely effective one, the essential part of Russian culture, well-known around the world and described best by Nikolai Gogol and Nikolai Saltykov-Shchedrin. This is bribe.

The bribery in Russia goes back to the Golden Horde times. The fact that Mongolian Khans used to appoint princes of the Russian principalities is notorious. The special charter that approved the given rights on power was called yarlik. For getting this yarlik from the hands of the Khan, princes often used various tricks, quite often the amoral ones. These were the intrigues, denunciations and slander. And of course no one prince dared to arrive to the Mongolian

capital without gifts. The side and the opulence of the gifts often were the decisive factor. The Khan had to be satisfied, because the Khan's favor didn't depend on personal and administrative virtues.

The tradition of giving the gifts to superiors is still alive in Russia. Bribery is not only a part of the system, but it is also the instrument of inferior policy. Of course, the fact of giving a swag is exceedingly hard to prove, but there are some evidences.

Civil War in Ukraine in the 17<sup>th</sup> century has loosen up the Orthodox Church, too. Right after Bogdan Khmelnytskyi death the czar government took over the subordination of Ukrainian church to Moscow.

The decision to join the Kiev Metropolitanate to the Moscow Patriarchy was made during the Constantinople Assembly in 1686. Although there was no mention about the conformity of Ukrainian church to Moscow in the Ukrainian-Russian agreement of 1654, Moscow ignored this and put forward such claims [65, C.212]. The process of subordination of Ukrainian church to Moscow lasted for over than thirty years and faced resistance from both the Ukrainians and Constantinople. At last, the Moscow government, thanks to the variety of intrigues, despite the law and church traditions, managed to get the Patriarch's consent. For depreciation of Ukrainian church patriarch Dionysius got 200 gold coins and 120 sable skins. In given to Moscow cantors receipt Dionysius called this bribe as a "mercy" [68, C.434].

Sounds like an anecdote, but soon it turned a tragedy to the people of Eastern Europe. Thanking to this receipt the fact of giving the swag became the proved one. The next generations of corrupters, seems, were careful and left no documentary evidences.

*"When near, make it appear that you are far away; when far away, that you are near."* Decree of the President of Ukraine № 133/2015 banned a number of Russian Internet resources, in particular social networks "Vkontakte" and "Odnoklassniki" were blocked [35].

This measure has turned out as an effective one. First, previously the Ukrainians took second place after the Russians who visited Russians Internet resources. For instant, in May 2017, 125 million of people visited Russian Internet resources every day, among them were 24 million of Ukrainian citizens. After prohibition, 9 million of the Ukrainians visited Russian sites per day. So the loss estimates at 15 million of users [30, C. 8]. Second, these sanctions have a grave effect for Russian business. Earlier, Russian Internet resources were taking a dominant position on Ukrainian market. Before the forbiddance, social media "Vkontakte" was the second after Google by audience coverage, also "Yandex", "Odnoklassniki" and mail.ru were setting in the midst of the Top-10 of the most popular resources. No Russian company left in the Top-10 after the imposition of ban [30, C.9]. These results seem to be a good ones for a belligerent country.

The blockage of Russian Internet resources met different estimates. Someone greeted this measures and even deleted their profiles from social media. The others criticized it and expressed their indignation, even the talking about censorship took place. Some experts even expressed concern.

At first sight social networks were created exclusively for fun. Seems, there is nothing bad in social media. After all, a lot of Ukrainians had an opportunity to express their point of view, post make new acquaintances, or just “kill time” and escape from boredom.

The majority of Ukrainians were uninformed on reverse side of this medal. From August 1, 2016, a new law has come into force in Russia, It gave full right to FSB employers in getting all the personal data of all Internet users, no matter were they Russian citizens or no [52]. Thereby, every Ukrainian that used to enjoy Russian social media was in danger of turning into the instrument of Russian special services manipulation. This is the example of our rival's guile: innocent fun at first glance – but the enemy is occultly present in every Ukrainian house.

Besides, these social medias were converted into tool of propaganda and manipulation. Russian ideology was totally attendant in “Vkontakte”. News of the community “Russia, Ukraine, Belarus: Patriots against OUN/UPA” have such titles, as “There is no Ukrainian nation”, “Crimea is a Russian territory”, “Let's destroy nationalist trash!” [6, C.34]. On demand of stopping of such a xenophobic and anti-Ukrainian appeals, the censors usually answered that they weren't going to restrict freedom of speech. In return, pro-Ukrainian communities were closed down.

The other Russian social media “Odnoklassniki” advocated the nostalgia for the Soviet Union and apologia of Russian politician regime. It contained groups fostered, for example, “Nostalgia. Let's remember the USSR and the 1990-es”, “We are from the USSR”, “Songs of our youths”. The other communities were named “Putin is our President”, “Putin is a handsome man!!!”, “Putin, we are with you!” [6, C.35]. So, the content of such posts is easy to guess.

In this case the destiny of creation and transformation of social media “Vkontakte” can be a good example. In 2011 it considered as a successive start-up and estimated in \$ 1,5 billion [48]. More than 110 million of accounts were registered in the site [48]. But “Vkontakte” used to be a business project till authorities realized of the possibility of its use.

In 2014 Pavel Durov, founder of “Vkontakte”, left Russia. Prior, he was dismissed from the post of the general director of the company. *“I am not in Russia now, and I have no plans of returning. Unfortunately, it's impossible to do Internet business in this country,”* – he said in his interview in online edition TechCrunch [18]. *“I fear that there are no way back. After my public refusal in cooperation with authorities, they can't tolerate me,”* - Mr Durov added [18].

Russia was always using special services and development system of agents for holding under its subjects. Now, its appropriate to have a glance on recent past – it is about times when Ukraine was a part of Soviet Union. Though Moscow was far, the party nomenclature managed to have total control over the whole country and every its citizen as well, owing to developed agent system and practice of denunciations. For those who dared go beyond the established by the Communist party limits, the method came to death sentence applied – it was article in Moscow press.

1970, Odessa State University named after I.I.Mechnikov. This, once third-rate provincial university became the one of the best in republic owing to energetic activity of its rector, Alexander Yurzhenko. He was a Ukrainian by origin and,

unlike his intimidated by the Communist government compatriots, didn't concealed it. Even more, he used to converse exclusively Ukrainian, and the chauvinistic Party committee of the University was really enraged. The respond did not delay. In May the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union newspaper published article “Costs of Gullibility”, where referring of numerous letters by the Communists, a lot of claims have been made to rector, he was accused in incompetence and excess of his power [14, C.33]. May 29<sup>th</sup> the solution on the announcement of a severe reprimand to Mr Yurzhenko and entering it into a card was made by the Party committee of the University [14, C.37]. It was the end of his career.

May 29, 1974, article “Costs of Emotions” was given out in “Socialist Industry” newspaper. It included attacks on rector of Odessa Polytechnic Institute Constantine Zablonky [15, C.108]. The another article was published afterward, in “Literary Newspaper”, and then one more – again in “Socialist Industry” newspaper. April 26<sup>th</sup> the secret conference of Odessa city committee of Communist party of Ukraine occurred, and the decision to make a reprimand to Mr Zablonky was taken [15, C.158].

These are the samples of “Hand of Moscow” influence that can reach everywhere. Its agents were watching everyone and always have been ready to tie up the most argent liberals. This was the demonstration of the nearness if it far away.

*“Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him”*. For a long period of time Cossacks played a leading role in Ukrainian society. Seghii Ploky notices that the Cossacks have come a long way: from small groups of fishers and hunters who got their prey in steppes South of Kiev to colonists of new lands of steppe boundaries; from private militants serving princes to musketeers – armed infantrymen that fought by themselves and obtained respect for foreigners; and, at last, from refugees and adventurers to united military brotherhood members that considered themselves for a separate state of society and demanded not only the money, but also recognition of their gentry status by government [53, C.125].

Zaporizhzhya Sich was a thriving land. It was situating far from the government power. Every Christian man had an opportunity come there and be accepted in Cossacks society easily. And as easily he could leave. Cossacks refused to recognize credibility of any ruler and carried out self-government. All the men in Zaporizhzhya Sich were equal rights and took part in the councils.

In these councils also Cossacks leaders were elected – they were hetman, otaman, osaul, clerk, outboard and judge. However, they could be overthrew as easily, too. Cossacks economic based on hunting, fishing, apiculture, saltwater. Trade also played a great role. Despite the democratic system, tensions between Cossacks officers and ordinary Cossacks arose once in a while [60, C.143]. Sometimes they had tragic consequences.

What the explanation for Cossacks evanescence and Zaporizhzhya Sich fall? There were two causes. First, the inner one, was mentioned before. Lack of tolerance between Cossacks and their internal contradictions led to collapse. Second, the outside cause, can be reded because the expansionist policy of Russian empire. It was Catherine II

---

who decisively conquered Cossacks. In 1785, according to the "Charter of rights, liberties and privileges of generous Russian nobility", Cossacks officers got the same rights as Russian noblemen [60, C.221]. Being satisfied with such a "gift", Cossack officers stood against Russian administration in Ukraine no more.

What the privileges? They were: inviolability of the person, property and honor guarantee, regional self-government, free entry and exit from the country permission [68, C.515]. Cossacks officers had only to confirm their status documented. This procedure based on the provision of papers that proved the person's affiliation to Cossacks officers or nobility of Rzechpospolita.

The other way of offering a bait concerns the specifics of the economy of the Russia empire. Moscow economic model was based on state monopoly, limited competition and excessive exploitation of resources [58, C.22]. The victory over Sweden as result of Northern War 1700-1721 helped Russians to impose their business rules. In 1714 the trade in strategically important goods was monopolized by St. Petersburg. Among these goods were Ukrainian potash, linen, goat's fat and naval wood. At the same time Ukrainian merchants were forced to stop trading in Krakow, Gdansk and Breslau, but they were commanded to conduct their business in Arkhangelsk. Private initiative was not welcomed, in return authorities preferred cooperation with controlled by state financial and industrial groups [58, C.23]. Soviet Union and modern Russia inherited this economic model.

This policy helped to form a loyal to empire bourgeoisie. After acquiring permit on doing business that helped to obtain wealth, this social stratum used to become the jealous advocate of the "Russian World" ideology.

But Moscow never provided its support for free. This was the Trojan horse. For its business support the Russians demanded making political decisions on its favor, thereby the privileges turned into trap. Russia exploited the oligarchs' interests to press them. Accordingly, the profits from doing business with Russia are the origin of bondage from Russian policy.

This statement can be illustrated by Ukrainian business. The businessmen who were integrating in Russian market came out the hostages of their companies in Russia and dialog with Kremlin. Ukrainian analyst Vitaliy Portnikov wrote in 2008 that a group of natural lobbyists have been forming in Ukraine. They were the businessmen who dealt with Russia. Politically, they even could be the supporters of the idea of EU and NATO introduction. Also they understood that every hasty word or step could entail closure their business in Russia or arriving of tax administration. They would know that it was necessary to arrange with Russia just because it "fed" them [54].

What the Russian methods of feigning disorder? Ukrainian armed forces were discredited in the late 1980s. Ukrainian army dragged on a miserable existence, and senior military leaders failed in gaining status of influential elite group [66, C.155]. For 23 years of Ukrainian independence, the number of armed forces has shortened in six times [21]. But not only collapse of economy and intraukrainian conflicts were its reasons. Ukrainian army slump was also the result of outright actions of Russian factors.

Academy of General Staff and the other Russian military universities alumni during 1992-1993 returned in Ukraine from Moscow. They took up key position in Ukrainian army at once. The fact that they were the Russian agents was not a mystery for no one, but nobody paid attention to it [61, C.13].

In 2014 Ukrainian army was in a crisis, and it facilitated the task of capture of Crimea and partly Donbass occupation for Mr Putin. But he did not considered the power of desire of the Ukrainian people to live in free democratic country. When military actions began in Donbass, volunteers rushed there, ordinary Ukrainians started to transfer money for Ukrainian army needs, the most active Ukrainian citizens started to provide our fighters on the East with everything that they needed. Ukrainian civil society stopped Russian aggression in Donbass in 2014. The project "Novorussia" was wrecked.

Journalist and coordinator of group "Information Resistance" Dmytro Timchuk said that starting from 2010, Ukrainian army have been pulling down purposefully [49]. When Russian aggression happened "*Army has demonstrated typical for the real patriots regard. Consolidation of soldiers on the basis of defense of Ukraine and loyalty to the oath took place. That was really amazing*" [49].

Not only military actions are used for destabilization. Protest political parties, dissatisfied minorities, media, activists-ecologists, business support, propagandist "analytical centers" etc. are the grateful recipients of Russian support and its ardent advocates abroad. This is the so-called "soft power" that Russia uses together with military power. Really, it is hard to find a country where Russia never employed its "soft power". But the several examples will be sufficient here.

Powerful mechanism was formed for realization of the "Russian World" project by Kremlin. In accordance with the presidential decree from 21<sup>st</sup> June 2007 the fund "Russian World" has been created in Russia and it was financed from the state budget. This funds objective was the assistance to gathering all the "fellow citizens" into the only one megacommunity, that would include all the Russians by origin, and all Russian citizens, representatives of Russian diaspora and Russian-speaking foreign citizens. In the decree was a sentence that the "Russian world" was the "World of Russia". And its component were the foreign "fellow citizens" that had to be supported and converted into the "idea of serving Russia" [9, C.16].

Russian propaganda has always been present in Ukraine, but after 2010 its agents became especially brazen. The number of anti-Ukrainian provocations in the media seemed to be impossible to count. They were various: starting from the idea of state liquidation and integration in Russia, up to the proposal of Ukrainian national football championship. In 2013 Ukrainian journalist Igol Losev wrote that "*It seems that psychological war is waging against Ukraine, and it has come up to the phase of total*" [44].

Kremlin energies are directed on European population. Mostly, they are the citizens of the ex-socialistic countries, that are retaining some historical and social connections with Russia, also if they have Russia-speaking citizens. Bulgaria, Serbia, Poland, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are in the risk area. For Russia, it's important to destroy the European Union idea itself – the unity and the democracy [42, C.24].

In action, the “soft power” turns into very effective and forceful instrumentality. If Russia succeeds, the “soft power” has grave consequences. The ultrarights are charmed by image of Russia as counterbalance of the EU and the law enforcement support policy. Russian position on the issue of homosexuality and boost of the “traditional” values are saluted by religious conservators. The Ultralefts are pleased by the conversations about fight against American hegemony. Even the European greens are the Moscow allies. They oppose extraction of shale gas and nuclear energy [13, C.16].

A significant number of Russian population has Kazakhstan. In 1990-1991 in Uralsk took place the events similar to the “Russian Spring” in Ukraine. There the local Kozak organization demanded the annexation of their land to Russian Federation. For a long time the confrontation between Russian and Kazakhs had a latent form, but in September 1991 street collisions happened. Then Kazakhs won the victory. In 1994 the fights took place in East Kazakhstan. In January in Ust-Kamenogorsk, where even now 60 per cent of population are the ethnic Russians, was held a rally organized by local Russian community. Its participants demanded the creation of national autonomy for ethnic Russians and providing status of state language for Russian language. 10,000 residents of the city participated in this rally. In response Mr Nazarbayev canceled the East Kazakhstan free economic in the problematic region. There was a opinion that its existence was the breeder for the separatist mood [29, C.22-23].

Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev declared his full loyalty to Russian Federation and desire to work together with Russia, but conducted pretty strict derussification policy and suppressed any pro-Russian movements or organizations ruthlessly. In 1995 was arrested otaman of Semirichensk Kozak army Nicolai Gunkin because of his advocacy of Kazakhstan entry into Russia and organizations of meetings in Almaty with the respective claims. In 1996 leaders of Kokchetav department of Siberian “Kozak” army, brothers Yuri and Victor Antoshko attempted to organize the armed uprising in Kokchetav region and create there a “state” like Prydnistronya or Abkhazia. This insurgency was squelched [29, C. 22-23].

The another attempt of creation of the “people’s republic” took place in 1999 in Ust-Kamenogorsk. In November a group of 22 persons was detained, 12 of them were the citizens of Russia. They were blamed in preparing for armed capture of territorial administration and revolt of local Russian population. The combatants intended to create the state “Russian land” on the territory of East Kazakhstan region. This group was led by nationalist Victor Kazimirchuk, called also Pugachev. Then the separatists were imprisoned for a long periods. After release Mr Kazimirchuk emigrated to Russia [29, C.22-23].

Similar events used to happen in Crimea and Donbass, too. The “Russian Spring” in Crimea had a well ahead ground. The major pro cent of Crimea population consisted of the ethnic Russians. Russian propaganda nourished anti-Ukrainian mood in the peninsula constantly. Even the Ukrainian speech caused a negative reaction. In Spring 2014 rumors were dissolving among the Crimean population. It was told about 200 buses with Ukrainian nationalists on board. The Russian-speaking Crimean citizens were afraid of

their probable discrimination by new Ukrainian authorities. It was talking that in Lviv the Russian-speaking citizens were forced to stay on their knees at the street while the Ukrainians were excreted urine on them and made them shout “Glory to Ukraine!” [5]. The Crimean believed this nonsense and backed up the separatists. This is the power of Russian propaganda able to make anyone believe the incredible things.

Donbass separatism has deep roots. Myth of the Donbass exclusivity was created at one time with the Soviet government. The solidarity of miners was its basis. In this environment the motto that “Donbass feeds all the country” was born. During the 1920-1930es the profession of a miner got heroic aureole, and the official propaganda depicted the colliers as real Atlas holding the economic power of the country on his shoulders. Miners were called “the labor guard”, famous Stakhanov record was set in Donbass, Donbass was named “the heart of Russia” at famous Soviet poster [28, C.32].

In 1993 the mass strike broke out. Donbass miners demanded the regional autonomy from Kiev. The colliers were convinced that they were nourishing the parasites, as they considered the population of Western Ukraine and Kiev. In 1994, 80 per cent of population in the region wished the federalization of Donbass. Separatist claims also were heard in time of miner’s strikes in 1996-1998 [28, C.32-33].

*“When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him”.*

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that Russian Federation “*was intensively investing in defense. It has shown that can deploy its forces in a very short time... First of all, the readiness to resort to force was demonstrated*” [13, C.13].

The process of modernization of Russian army started after war with Georgia in 2008. The plans for modernization were painted up to 2020, the total amount of expenses was estimated in \$ 750 billion that projected on renovation of military equipment. “*We paid a little attention to army in recent years. We need to make up for lost and make such a major breakthrough that we had in the 1930es*”, – said Mr Putin in the end of August 2012 and added that prime minister Dmitry Medvedev has taken his personal control over the realization of project of Russian army modernization [34].

Russian historian Andrew Zubov said that cold war mythology was recently reviving in Russia. Russian authorities were pedaling this theme and a large part of the population approved that. This assertion had the Soviet Union ideology as its basis, and referred to those times when the USSR was considered as outpost of progress and contradiction to capitalistic world. Common Russians believed that the USA and the EU were the enemies of their country [2, C.37].

In hybrid war information is also a weapon, and Russia has always been using it in full measure, at home and abroad. Russian state controls the home media. They broadcast lie and various conspiracy theories. In 2005 was created television channel “Russia Today” that has to distribute a positive image of RF, but later it started to falsify the image of the West. Western speakers are frequent guests of RT. They are extreme left antiglobalists, ultraright

---

nationalists and disappointed citizens. Broadcasting is in English, Spanish and Arabian. The numeric of its audience calculates in 700 million all over the world [13, C.16]. The annual budget of RT is about € 8 billion [40, C.11].

During the week, from 1 to 7 August 2017, NATO combat aircraft in Lithuania and Estonia, for eight times were rising in the air for interception of Russian planes that fled over the Baltic Sea [26]. July 26<sup>th</sup> the British combat aircraft Typhoon, based in Romania, has went up for interception of Russian airplanes over the Black Sea [24]. There is no general statistics for 2017. It was noticed in report of Henry Jackson Society that NATO combat aircraft in Europe about 800 times rose for interception of Russian planes in 2016, twice more than in 2014 [25].

Russian tanks cross the board of neighboring countries, NATO conducts military trains near Russian boundaries, Russia conducts military trains near the frontiers of NATO countries, the accusations in espionage are resounding, mutual diplomat expulsions take place, Kremlin accuses West countries in attempts of destabilization in Russia. Mr Putin shows his hostility to the West diplomacy, blocks global initiatives and squeezes out pro-Western non-government organizations [3, C.36]. But he avoids direct clash with NATO armed forces.

*"Anger his general and confuse him"*. In 1786 lands of the Right-bank Ukraine were overtaken by disastrous rebellion known as Koliivshchyna.

Rzeczpospolita noblemen were outraged by Russian empress's Catherine II ceaseless interference in home Poland affairs. At first she has succeeded in gaining Rzeczpospolita throne for her favorite Stanislaw Poniatovsky, and then she compelled the Polish noblemen to guarantee religious rights and freedoms for the Orthodox subjects. In February 1768 enraged by intimidation noblemen gathered themselves in Bar confederation and attacked Russian troops that were located on Polish lands [60, C.244].

As reaction on the rumors about persecution of the Orthodox by confederates, Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants lifted the uprising and started to slay Jews, Catholics and Greek-Catholics. This insurgence spread all the Kiev region, and the number of insurgents was 2,000 people. The climax of the revolt was the Uman siege, where Catholics were hiding. June 21<sup>th</sup> the city was handed over by fortress guard centurion Ivan Honta, who moved to rebel side. When Cossacks and peasants took the city, they committed cruel massacres there [31, C.215].

These actions were sharply condemned in St. Peterburg, even Russian army was sent for uprising suppress. Most interesting the actions of Russian government that happened before.

In the middle of March 1768 confederates edited their first manifestos. Later, at the interrogation, rebel leader Maxim Zalizniak testified that nearby March 20-26<sup>th</sup> seven Zaporizhazhyan Cossaks led by Yefim Shelest arrived before him in Motronin Monastery, where he was residing at that time. Yefim Shelest supposedly showed him the otaman's letter that ordered to attack confederates also chase Poles and Jews. In several days Yefim Shelest was killed, the letter was evanesced; in return 700 Zaporizhazhyan Cossaks and 300 Right-bank Ukraine inhabitants gathered near the monastery, Maxim Zalizniak was elected as otaman and a monk served a prayer service on success of the case

(later called the "knives consecration" in folklore tradition) [68, C488]. Although the letter was lost, insurgents were talking about the Catherine II "golden charter" that allegedly claimed for killing Jews, Catholics and Greek-Catholics in behalf of the Orthodox Faith approval [31, C.215]. Having managed the Ukrainian revolt, Russian army liquidated the main centers of Bar confederates' resistance.

In June, 1771 negotiations between Russia, Austria and Prussia started, and August 5<sup>th</sup>, 1772 the trilateral agreement was signed. According to it, Prussia got Gdansk Pomerania sized in 36,000 square kilometer and 580,000 population; Austria received Small Poland, also Rus, Belz and Podillya voivodships, partly Volyn (83,000 square kilometer and 2,650,000 population); Russia obtained Livonia and Eastern Belarus, the territory in 92,000 square kilometer and 1,300,000 population [31, C.217]. That was the first division of Rzeczpospolita.

*"Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance"*. Tussle between the Russians and the Ukrainians lasts for a long time. Its origin can be found in Pereyaslav Cousil in 1654, when Ukrainian hetman Bogdan Khmelnytsky and Moscow czar's Aleksei Mukhailovich representatives put an agreement. The Ukrainians considered it just as a military and political alliance for gaining victory over Rzeczpospolita, while the Russians assumed it for the act of incorporation of Ukraine into their state, as the realization of the "Third Rome" concept and "gathering of all Russian lands" idea [57, C.295]. Muscovy was a weak state then.

Cossack uprising that started in 1648, has turned into grand war over time, and that war rearranged the map of Ukraine and indirectly pushed for changes of geopolitical structures in Central and Eastern Europe, where shortly the Russian empire has established itself and Rzeczpospolita vanished [68, C.313].

Military actions lasted six years. The rivals were exhausted, so the question of the search of the ally arose for Bogdan Khmelnytsky. There were three possibilities: the reconciliation with Polish noblemen, the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire or the alliance with Muscovy. Among them, Bogdan Khmelnytsky has chosen the weakest one. It was Muscovy.

*"Keep him under a strain and wear him down"*. The Ukrainians met New Year 2014 being depressed and disappointed. The hope for Maidan was an uncertain one. After escape of Victor Yanukovich the Crimea was annexed and war in Donbass has started.

Ukrainian nation was ready for this challenge. Volunteers went to the East. Army aid funds were charged by millions: Ukrainians abroad, businessmen, students, employers, pensioners deducted their money for help. Slovyansk, Artemivsk, Debaltsevo were released [37, C.5].

Delaying the conflict and pulling time are also the tactics. 2017 year. The war is lasting for three years. The Ukrainians are tired of war, most of them are dreaming of peace [41, C.18]. A lot of Ukrainians are supporting the idea of stop the war in Donbass.

There are two means of war stop. It can be signing a peace treaty. And also it can be capitulation. Common citizens want peace, and, if the public opinion will be prepared respectively, the population may require peace "at any price". Public opinion has a tremendous importance in democratic country.

"When he is united, divide him". There was a mention before about mutual hostility between the Orthodox Ukrainians and the Catholic Poles in Rzeczpospolita. The absence of tolerance was common for the times of Middle Ages and Early Modern. But it has tragic consequences for Eastern Europe.

From the end of the 14<sup>th</sup> century Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a tolerant country. The religious variety was the cause of indifferent relation to Greek and Rome church traditions both for the Catholics and for the Orthodox [68, C.166]. But this tolerance was the consequence of the political conjuncture, not the purposeful government policy. The situation has changed from the ending of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, after Muscovy claimed its path of "gathering" the lands of Kievan Rus [68, C.167]. Since, Muscovy czars used religious tensions between the Catholics and the Orthodox in their intrigue. Practically every the Cossack rebellion, that was inspired by Muscovy, occurred with the motto of "Orthodox Church defense".

In the 20<sup>th</sup> century Russia was exporting Bolshevism and exploited foreign communists in its struggle against the West. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, having fears inflamed and undermined trust of publicity by disinformation, Russia supports the organizations that attract the disappointed people [46].

"Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you". This is the illustration of the Ukrainian situation after 2013. We were told that the Russians were our "brothers" and "friends" for 25 years. We were told about the NATO aggressiveness. And what do we have at last? Annexation and occupation are not the same things that we were expecting from our friends.

**Conclusions.** This paper was devoted to the analysis of only the several Sun Tzu quotations. The study of "The Art of War" treatise seems to be helpful in waging hybrid war. For instance, this quotation can help is in victory prognosis:

"If you say which ruler possesses moral influence, which commander is the more able, which army obtains the advantages of nature and the terrain, in which regulations and instructions are better carried out, which troops are the stronger; which has the better trained officers and men; and which administers rewards and punishments in a more enlightened manner; I will be able to forecast which side will be victorious and which defeated"[73, C.65-66].

Sun Tzu was commented for a lot of times by specialists in various situations and periods of history. Hybrid war is distinct from the previous wars. Now "The Art of War" needs the another clarification. That's why it seems to be useful in dealing the Hybrid war.

"Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril" [73, C. 84]. Russia has been building its positive image abroad for decades. Huge amounts of money, propagandist channels, pro-Russian experts and "useful idiots" helped to do this. But not the real face of Russia was shown. Russia always showed the face that it wanted to show. In addition, Russia has always been used its spies and agents for knowing all about its counterparties. Obviously, Russian informational strategy was both knowing the truth of the rival and not getting the rival to know all the truth about itself.

Perceptions of history are different in Russia and in the West. If in the West history plays role of a kind of art or

section of anthropology, that pursues the goal of esthetical or science needs, for Russian history is a refined weapon. Russian historical myths are more efficient than the "Grads". It is clear who is your enemy, if you are waging traditional war. The hybrid war means make soldiers doubt in their rightness. "History breeding" methods goes far – it makes the conquered nations exculpate their enslavers, sometimes even love them. Something like "Stockholm syndrome".

At last but not at least. It is not only Ukraine is that faced Russian aggression. This war is waging against democracy, the West, the Western values. When it started? Three years ago? Or three hundred years ago?

#### Література

1. Я він же казав! // Український тиждень. – № 33-34 (405-406). – 21-27.08.2015. – С. 50.
2. Андрей Зубов: "Із криз Росія виходила завдяки налагодженню зв'язків із закордоном та вступу до європейських політичних союзів" / Спілкувалася Т. Шреґуб // Український тиждень. – № 46 (366). – 14-20.11.2014. – С. 37-38.
3. Бініон М. Невесела перспектива // Український тиждень. – № 50 (370). – 12-18.12.2014. – С. 36-37.
4. Брехуненко В. Спершу свідомість, потім зброя // Український тиждень. – № 52 (372). – 26.12.2014-26.01.2015. – С. 52-56.
5. Буракова В. Без оголошення війни // Український тиждень. – № 10 (330). – 7-13.03.2014. – С. 8-9.
6. Буракова В. Невидимий контроль // Український тиждень. – № 23 (291). – 14-20.06.2013. – С. 34.
7. Вайра Віке-Фрейберга: "Після розпаду СРСР Захід мав надто романтичний погляд на Росію" / Спілкувалася О. Ворожбит // Український тиждень. – № 51 (371). – 19-25.12.2014. – С. 10-11.
8. Василенко В. Генеза і мета спецоперації // Український тиждень. – № 23 (291). – 14-20.06.2013. – С. 14-15.
9. Василенко В. Механізми і засоби здійснення спецоперації // Український тиждень. – № 23 (291). – 14-11.20.2013. – С. 16-19.
10. Василенко В. Про відмінність тероризму від збройної агресії // Український тиждень. – № 10 (330). – 7-13.03.2014. – С. 7-8.
11. Великий тлумачний словник сучасної української мови / Авт. кер. та гол. ред. Бусел В. П. – Київ – Ірпінь: Перун, 2003. – 440 с.
12. Визнана ворогом // Український тиждень. – № 23 (291). – 14-20.06.2013. – С. 12-13.
13. Від холодної війни до гарячої // Український тиждень. – № 7 (379). – 20-26.02.2015. – С. 12-16.
14. Гончарук Т.І., Іваніченко А.М. Персональна справа № 88. – Одеса: Бахва, 2016. – 188 с.
15. Гончарук Т.І., Іваніченко А.М. Ректор від Бога. – Одеса: Астропринт, 2017. – 176 с.
16. Джеймс Мейс: "Ваші мертві вибрали мене..." / За заг. ред. Л. Івшиної. – К.: Видавництво ЗАП "Українська прес-група", 2008. – 672 с.
17. Джон Гербст: "Криза міжнародної безпеки впливає з агресії Кремля проти України і його ширших амбіцій на пострадянському терені" / Спілкувалася Т. Шреґуб // Український тиждень. – № 47 (367). – 21-27.2014. – С. 28-29.
18. Дуров сказав, що покинув Росію і не хоче повертатися // Руска служба BBC. 22.04.2014. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: [http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/04/140422\\_иср\\_durov\\_resignation\\_denial](http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/04/140422_иср_durov_resignation_denial). – Дата звернення: 01.09.2017.
19. Ева Шолпсон. Після колонії / Спілкувалася Ю. Махаров // Український тиждень. – № 30 (39). – 25-31 липня 2008. – С. 14-19.
20. Журженко П. Геополітика пам'яті // Критика. – № 3-4 (137-138). – Березень-квітень, 2009. – С. 12-15.
21. Іванов А. В лампасах і «Бриони» // Коментарі. – №9. – 14 марта, 2014. – С. 6-7.
22. Іващенко А.М., Шпюра М.І. Еволюція поглядів на стратегію сучасного гібридного конфлікту та сценарії протидії гібридним

загрозам // Збірник наукових праць Центру воєнно-стратегічних досліджень Національного університету оборони України імені Івана Черняхівського. – 2015. – № 1. – С. 18-23. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: [file:///C:/Users/HHP/Downloads/znprcvsd\\_2015\\_1\\_5%20\(2\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/HHP/Downloads/znprcvsd_2015_1_5%20(2).pdf).

23. Історія конфлікту Естонії та Росії: перенос «Бронзового солдата» // Заголовки. – 29 грудня 2007. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <http://www.zagolovki.ru/daytheme/soldat/29Dec2007>. – Дата ображення: 23.07.2017.

24. Істребитель Британії перехватив російськіє Іл-22 над Чорним морем // Ліга. Новини. 26.07.2017. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: [http://news.liga.net/news/world/14793289-istrebitel\\_britanii\\_perekhvatil\\_rossijskie\\_il\\_22\\_nad\\_cernym\\_morem.htm](http://news.liga.net/news/world/14793289-istrebitel_britanii_perekhvatil_rossijskie_il_22_nad_cernym_morem.htm). – Дата звернення: 10.08.2017.

25. Істребители НАТО совершили около 800 перехватов российских самолетов // Голос Америки. 13.07.2017. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/nato-russia-jet-scrambles/3942389.html>. – Дата звернення: 10.08.2017.

26. Істребители НАТО 8 раз перехватывали российские самолеты над Балтией за неделю // Цензор.нет. 08.08.2017. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: [https://censor.net.ua/news/450929/istrebiteli\\_nato\\_8\\_raz\\_perekhvativali\\_rossijskie\\_samolety\\_nad\\_baltiei\\_za\\_nedelyu](https://censor.net.ua/news/450929/istrebiteli_nato_8_raz_perekhvativali_rossijskie_samolety_nad_baltiei_za_nedelyu). – Дата звернення: 10.08.2017.

27. Йонатан Толслар: “ЄС зараз бореться із геополітичною дезорієнтацією” / Спілкувалася О. Ворожбит // Український тиждень. – № 45 (365). – 7-13.2014. – С. 30-31.

28. Казанський Д. Витоки донецького сепаратизму // Український тиждень. – № 51 (371). – 19-25.12.2014. – С. 32-33.

29. Казанський Д. Контроль над Північчю // Український тиждень. – № 27 (503). – 7-13.07.2017. – С. 22-23.

30. Казанський Д. Невіртуальний ефект // Український тиждень. – № 23 (499). – 9-15.06.2017. – С. 8-9.

31. Камінський Суліма А. Історія Речі Посполитої як історія багатьох народів, 1505-1795. Громадяни, їхня держава, суспільство, культура. – К.: Наш час, 2011. – 263 с.

32. Карбівничий В. Путін объявил новую «холодную войну» Украине // Коментаріи. – № 7. – 22 лютого, 2013. – С. 2.

33. Карамзин Н.М. Історія державства Російського. – 1203 с. [online]. Accessed: <file:///C:/Users/HHP/Downloads/Istoriya-gosudarstva-Rossijskogo.pdf>. – Дата звернення: 22.08.2017.

34. Козинський А. Россия активно вооружается // Інформ.ру. 17.09.2012. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <http://informa.ru/russia/20120917/199328590.html>. – Дата звернення: 10.08.2017.

35. Коли почне діяти заборона “Вконтакте”, “Однокласники” та “Яндекс”: назвали дату // 24 канал. 16.05.2017. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: [http://24tv.ua/zaborona\\_vkontakte\\_odnoklasniki\\_yandexa\\_koli\\_pochne\\_diyati\\_zakon\\_n818066](http://24tv.ua/zaborona_vkontakte_odnoklasniki_yandexa_koli_pochne_diyati_zakon_n818066). – Дата звернення: 03.08.2017.

36. Крамар О. Алетити російського реваншизму // Український тиждень. – № 4 (376). – 30.01-5.02.2015. – С. 22-23.

37. Крапивенко Д. За новим календарем // Український тиждень. – № 52 (372). – 26.12.2014-15.01.2015. – С. 4-5.

38. Кульчицький С.В. 1933: трагедія голоду. – К.: ПІ-во “Знання” УРСР, 1989. – 48 с.

39. Лавров знову заявив, що військових та зброї РФ на Донбасі немає // Українформ – 01.12.2016. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/2131136-lavrov-znovu-zayaviv-so-vijskovich-ta-zbroi-rf-na-donbasi-netae.html>. – Дата звернення: 30.08.2017.

40. Лапаєв Ю. Непомітна зброя // Український тиждень. – № 50 (474). – 12-22.12.2016. – С. 10-11.

41. Лапаєв Ю. Розпаловання миру // Український тиждень. – № 28 (504). – 14-20.2017. – С. 16-18.

42. Лапаєв Ю. Фейккрати // Український тиждень. – № 21 (497). – 25.05-1.06.2017. – С. 24-25.

43. Лосєв І. Азійсько-деспотичні орієнтири // Український тиждень. – № 20 (496). – 19-25.2017. – С. 40-41.

44. Лосєв І. “Русскій мір”: маразм міцнішає... // Український тиждень. – № 9 (277). – 28.02-6.03.2013. – С. 27.

45. Лукас Е. Гонка цифрових озброєнь / Е. Лукас // Український тиждень. – № 26 (502). – 2017. – С. 7.

46. Лукас Е. Де і як Кремль нападе знову? // Український тиждень. – № 21 (497). – 26.05-1.06.2017. – С. 7.

47. Малєєв С. Степовий фронт // Український тиждень. – № 27 (503). – 7-13.07.2017. – С. 20-21.

48. На вершині. Перва трійка нашого списку – самі знамениті інвестор, менеджер та основатель стартапа // Forbes. – Март, 2011. – № 3 (84). – С. 90.

49. О военных в Крыму / Дмитрий Шымчук, Беседовал Е. Стружкін // Коментаріи. – № 9. – 14 марта, 2014. – С. 6.

50. Общие потери от вируса Petya могут достичь \$ 53 млрд – отчет // РІА новости Украина. – 17.07.2017. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <http://rian.com.ua/economy/20170717/1025916317.html>. – Дата звернення: 25.07.2017.

51. Олександр Шубін: “Цього літа я частіше бував у ФСБ, ніж на морі” / Записав Б. Буткевич // Український тиждень. – № 49 (369). – 5-11.12.2014. – С. 22-23.

52. Павлоковський Є. Чим небезпечні для українців російські інтернет-сервіси // Громадське радіо. 24.07.2016. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <https://fromadskeradio.org/programs/tankova-tyulya/chut-nebezpechni-dlya-ukrayinciv-rosijski-internet-servisov>. – Дата звернення: 03.08.2017.

53. Пляхій С. Брама Європи. Історія України від скіфських воєн до незалежності. – Харків: Клуб сімейного дозвілля, 2016. – 496 с.

54. Портницьков В. Еміграція холодильників // Контракти. – № 16-17. – 21.04.2008. – С. 18.

55. Радковець Ю.І. Ознаки технологій “гібридної війни” в агресивних діях Росії проти України // Наука і оборона, 3/2014. – С.36-42. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: [file:///C:/Users/HHP/Downloads/pauio\\_2014\\_3\\_8%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/HHP/Downloads/pauio_2014_3_8%20(1).pdf). – Дата звернення: 06.07.2017.

56. Рябчук М. Реконструкція регіону // Критика. – № 3-4. – Липень-серпень, 2010. – С. 9-14.

57. Смілій В., Степанков В. Українська національна революція ХVІІ ст. (1648 – 1676 рр.). – К.: Видавничий дім “Києво-Могилянська академія”, 2009. – 447 с.

58. Сокурко О. Імперсько-радянський феодалізм // Український тиждень. – № 27 (295). – 5-11.06.2013. – С. 22-23.

59. Став відомий обсяг збитків, завданих бізнесу вірусом Petya // Finance.ua. 12.07.2017. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <http://news.finance.ua/ua/news-/406209/stav-vidomuj-obsyag-zbytkiv-zavdanujh-biznesu-virusom-petya>. – Дата звернення: 25.07.2017.

60. Субтельний О. Україна. Історія. – Вид. 3-тє, доп. і перероб. – К.: Либідь, 1993. – 720 с.

61. Пінченко Я. Лише молоді офіцери радикально змінять Збройні сили України. – Український тиждень. – № 52 (372). – 26.12.2014-15.01.2016. – С. 12-15.

62. Пінченко Я. Як російські війська 23 серпня заходили на Донбас // Український тиждень. – № 51 (371). – 19-25.12.2014. – С. 12-14.

63. Поп-10 найбільших кібератак десятиріччя. The Foreign Policy виділило 10 найбільших кібератак за останні 10 років // Тиждень.ua. – 27 лютого 2012. [Електронний ресурс]. Режим доступу: <http://tyzhden.ua/News/43416>. – Дата звернення: 25.07.2017.

64. Трактати о военном искусстве / Сунь-Цзы, У-Цзы; Пер. С. Кит., предисл. и коммент. Н.Н. Конрада. – М.: ООО «Издательство АСП», Спб.: Terra Fantastica, 2003. – 558 с.

65. Федорів, о. Юрій. Історія церкви в Україні. – Львів: Монастир Монахів Студитського Уставу – Видавництво відділу “Свічудо”, 2001. – 362 с.

66. Шульга Н. Фрейф на обочині. Двадцять лет общественных изменений в Украине. – К.: ООО «Друкарня “Бізнесполіграф”», 2011. – 448 с.

67. Юнусов А. Свято непослуху // Український тиждень. – № 9 (329). – 28.02-6.03.2014. – С. 26-27.

68. Яковенко Н. Нарис історії середньовічної та ранньо-модерної України. – 4-те вид. – К.: Критука, 2009. – 537 с.

69. Cambridge International Dictionary of English. – Cambridge University Press, 2000. – 1774 p.

70. Gen. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Vol 1 / Translated by Colonel J.J. Graham. – London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. – New York: E. P. Dutton and Co, 1918. – 314 p. [online]. Accessed: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clausewitz-on-war-vol-1>. – Дата звернення: 21.08.2017.

71. Lt Col Daniel T. Lasica. Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory: A Monograph. – AY 2009. – 56 p. [online]. Accessed: [file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/ADA513663%20\(2\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/ADA513663%20(2).pdf). – Дата звернення: 06.07.2017.

72. Марх К. Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the 18th Century // Марх & Engels. Collected Works. Volume 15. – Lawrence & Wishart, Electric Book, 2010. – 807 p. [online]. Accessed: [http://www.hekmatist.com/Marx%20Engels/Marx%20%20Engels%20Collected%20Works%20Volume%2015\\_%20Ka%20-%20Karl%20Marx.pdf](http://www.hekmatist.com/Marx%20Engels/Marx%20%20Engels%20Collected%20Works%20Volume%2015_%20Ka%20-%20Karl%20Marx.pdf). – Дата звернення: 22.08.2017.

73. Sun Tzu. The Art of War / Translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. – Oxford University Press. – 150 p. [online]. Accessed: <https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/1.1/Sun%20Tzu.pdf>. – Дата звернення: 21.08.2017.

### References

1. А вин же казав! // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 33-34 (405-406). – 21-27.08.2015. – С. 50.

2. Андриєй Зубов: "Із крiзь Росiя вi'ходь'ла завдяк'ю' налагодженню зв'язкiв із закордоном та вступу до європейськiх полiтичнiх союзiв" / Spilkuvalasya G. Tregub // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 46 (366). – 14-20.11.2014. – С. 37-38.

3. Binion M. Nevesela perspekti'va // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 50 (370). – 12-18.12.2014. – С. 36-37.

4. Брехуненко В. Spershu svidomist', potim zbroya // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 52 (372). – 26.12.2014-26.01.2015. – С. 52-56.

5. Burlakova V. Bez ogołoshehnyya viny // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 10 (330). – 7-13.03.2014. – С. 8-9.

6. Burlakova V. Nevdy'myj kontrol // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 23 (291). – 14-20.06.2013. – С. 34.

7. Vajra Vike-Frejberg'a: "Pishya rozpadu SRSR, Zaxid mav nadto romantychnyj poglyad na Rosiyu / Spilkuvalas' O. Vorozhbyt // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 51 (371). – 19-25.12.2014. – С. 10-11.

8. Vasylenko V. Geneza i meta speczoperaciyi // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 23 (291). – 14-20.06.2013. – С. 14-15.

9. Vasylenko V. Mexanizmy i zasoby' zdijshennya speczoperaciyi // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 23 (291). – 14-20.06.2013. – С. 16-19.

10. Vasylenko V. Pro vidminnist' teroryzmu vid zbrojnoyi agresiyi // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 10 (330). – 7-13.03.2014. – С. 7-8.

11. Vely'kyj tlumachnyj slovnyk suchasnoyi ukrayins'koyi movy' / Avt. ker. ta gol. red. Busel V. T. – Ky'yiv – Irpin': Perun, 2003. – 440 s.

12. Vy'znana vorogom // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 23 (291). – 14-20.06.2013. – С. 12-13.

13. Bid xolodnoyi viny do garyachoi // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 7 (379). – 20-26.02.2015. – С. 12-16.

14. Goncharuk G. I., Ivanichenko L. M. Personal'na sprava # 88. – Odesa: Vaxva, 2016. – 188 s.

15. Goncharuk G. I., Ivanichenko L. M. Rektor vid Boga. – Odesa: Astropry'nt, 2017. – 176 s.

16. Dzhejms Mejs: "Vashii mertvi vy'braly' mene..." / Za zag. red. L. Ivshynoyi. – K.: Vy'davny'ctvo ZAT "Ukrayins'ka pres-grupa", 2008. – 672s.

17. Dzhon Gerbst: "Kry'za mizhnarodnoyi bezpeky' vy'ply'vaye z agresiyi Kremlya proty' Ukrayiny' i jogo shy'rshy'x ambicij na postradyans'komu tereni" / Spilkuvalas' G. Tregub // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 47 (367). – 21-27.2014. – С. 28-29.

18. Durov skazal. chto pokynul Rossiyu i ne kshochet vozvrashchatsya // Russkaya sluzhba VVS. 22.04.2014. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim

dostupu: [http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/04/140422\\_ucp\\_durov\\_resignation\\_denial](http://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/04/140422_ucp_durov_resignation_denial). – Data zverennyya: 01.09.2017.

19. Eva Tompson. Pishya koloniyi / Spilkuvalasya Yu. Makarov // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 30 (39). – 25-31 ly'pnya 2008. – С. 14-19.

20. Zhurzhenko T. Geopolity'ka pam'yati // Kry'ty'ka. – № 3-4 (137-138). – Berezen'-kyiten', 2009. – С. 12-15.

21. Ivanov A. V lampasakh i «Brioni» // Kommentarii. – № 9. – 14 marta. 2014. – С. 6-7.

22. Ivashhenko A.M., Shipura M.I. Evolyuciya poglyadiv na strategiyu suchasnogo gibrydnogo konflikta ta scenariyi proty'diyi gibrydny'm zagrozam // Zbirnyk naukovy'x prac' Centru voyenno-strategichny'x doslidzhen' Nacional'nogo universytetu oborony' Ukrayiny' imeni Ivana Chernyaxovs'kogo. – 2015. – # 1. – С. 18-23. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: [file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/Znprcvsd\\_2015\\_1\\_5%20\(2\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/Znprcvsd_2015_1_5%20(2).pdf).

23. Istoriya konflikta Estonii i Rossii: perenos «Bronzovogo soldata» // Zagolovki. – 29 dekabrya 2007. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupa: <http://www.zagolovki.ru/daytheme/soldat/29Dec2007>. – Data obrashcheniya: 23.07.2017.

24. Istrebiteľi Britanii perekhvatil rossijskiye Tu-22 nad Chernym morem // Liga. Novosti. 26.07.2017. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: [http://news.liga.net/news/world/14793289-istrebiteľi\\_britanii\\_perekhvatil\\_rossijskiye\\_tu\\_22\\_nad\\_chernym\\_morem.htm](http://news.liga.net/news/world/14793289-istrebiteľi_britanii_perekhvatil_rossijskiye_tu_22_nad_chernym_morem.htm). – Data zverennyya: 10.08.2017.

25. Istrebiteľi NATO sovershili okolo 800 perekhvatov rossijskikh samoletov // Golos Ameriki. 13.07.2017. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: <https://www.golos-ameriki.ru/a/nato-russia-jet-scrambles/3942389.html>. – Data zverennyya: 10.08.2017.

26. Istrebiteľi NATO 8 raz perekhvatyvali rossijskiye samolety nad Baltiyej za nedelyu // Tsenzor.net. 08.08.2017. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: [https://censor.net.ua/news/450929/istrebiteľi\\_nato\\_8\\_raz\\_perekhvatyvali\\_rossijskiye\\_samolety\\_nad\\_baltiyei\\_za\\_nedelyu](https://censor.net.ua/news/450929/istrebiteľi_nato_8_raz_perekhvatyvali_rossijskiye_samolety_nad_baltiyei_za_nedelyu). – Data zverennyya: 10.08.2017.

27. Jonatan Golslag: "Yes zaraz bore't'sya iz geopolity'chnoy dezorijentaciyeyu" / Spilkuvalasya O. Vorozhbyt // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 45 (365). – 7-13.2014. – С. 30-31.

28. Kazans'kyj D. Vy'toky' donecz'kogo separaty'zmu // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 51 (371). – 19-25.12.2014. – С. 32-33.

29. Kazans'kyj D. Kontrol nad Pivnichchyu // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 27 (503). – 7-13.07.2017. – С. 22-23.

30. Kazans'kyj D. Nevirtual'nyj efekt // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 23 (499). – 9-15.06. 2017. – С. 8-9.

31. Kamins'kyj Sul'ma A. Istoriya Rechi Pospoly'toyi yak istoriya bagat'ox narodiv, 1505-1795. Gromadyany, yixitya derzhava, suspilstvo, kul'tura. – K.: Nash chas, 2011. – 263 s.

32. Karbivnichiy V. Putin obyavil novuyu «kholodnyuyu voynu» Ukraine // Kommentarii. – № 7. – 22 febralya. 2013. – С. 2.

33. Karamzin N. M. Istoriya gosudarstva Rossijskogo. – 1203 c. [online]. Accessed: <file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/Istoriya-gosudarstva-Rossijskogo.pdf>. – Data zverennyya: 22.08.2017.

34. Kozinskij A. Rossiya aktyvno vooruzhayetsya // Inosmi.ru. 17.09.2012. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: <http://inosmi.ru/russia/20120917/199328590.html>. – Data zverennyya: 10.08.2017.

35. Koly' pochne diyaty' zaborona «vkontakte», «odnoklasnyky» ta «Yandeksa»: nazvaly' datu // 24 kanal. 16.05.2017. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: [http://24tv.ua/zaborona\\_vkontakte\\_odnoklasniki\\_yandeksa\\_koli\\_pochne\\_diyati\\_zakon\\_n818066](http://24tv.ua/zaborona_vkontakte_odnoklasniki_yandeksa_koli_pochne_diyati_zakon_n818066). – Data zverennyya: 03.08.2017.

36. Kramar O. Apety'ty' rosij'skogo revanshy'zmu // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 4 (376). – 30.01-5.02.2015. – С. 22-23.

37. Krapyvenko D. Za novy'm kalendarem // Українськiй тиждiнь. – № 52 (372). – 26.12.2014-15.01.2015. – С. 4-5.

38. Kul'chy'cz'kyj S. V. 1933: tragediya golodu. – K.: T-vo "Znannya" URSR, 1989. – 48 s.

39. Lavrov znovu zayaty'v, slhio vijs'kovy'x ta zbroyi RF na Donbasi nemaye // Ukrinform – 01.12.2016. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: <https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-world/2131136>

- lavrov-znovu-zaaviv-so-vijskovih-ta-zbroi-rf-na-donbasi-nemae.html. – Data zvernennya: 30.08.2017.
40. Lapayev Yu. Nepomitna zbroya // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 50 (474). – 12-22.12.2016. – S. 10-11.
41. Lapayev Yu. Rozpabuvannya my'ru // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 28 (504). – 14-20.2017. – S. 16-18.
42. Lapayev Yu. Fejko'kraty' // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 21 (497). – 25.05-1.06.2017. – S. 24-25.
43. Losyev I. Azijs'ko-despoty'chni oriyenty'ry' // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 20 (496). – 19-25.2017. – S. 40-41.
44. Losyev I. "Russkij mir": marazm micznishay... // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 9 (277). – 28.02-6.03.2013. – S. 27.
45. Lukas E. Gonka cy'frov'y'ch ozbrojen' / E. Lukas // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 26 (502). – 2017. – S. 7.
46. Lukas E. De i yak K'rem' napade znovu? // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 21 (497). – 26.05-1.06.2017. – S. 7.
47. Mal'yeyev S. Stepovyj front // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 27 (503). – 7-13.07.2017. – S. 20-21.
48. Na vershine. Pervaya troyka nashego spiska — samyye znamenityye investor. menedzher i osnovatel startapa // Forbes. – Mart. 2011. – № 3 (84). – S. 90.
49. O voyennykh v Krymu / Dmitriy Tymchuk, Besedoval E. Struzhkin // Kommentarii. – № 9. – 14 marta. 2014. – S. 6.
50. Obschchiye poteri ot virusa Petya mogut dostich \$ 53 mlrd – otchet // RIA novosti Ukraina. – 17.07.2017. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: <http://ria.com.ua/economy/20170717/1025916317.html>. – Data zvernennya: 25.07.2017.
51. Oleksij Shubin: "Cz'ogo lita ya chastishe buvav u FSB, nizh na mori" / Zapy'sav B. Butkevych // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – # 49 (369). – 5-11.12.2014. – S. 22-23.
52. Pavlyukovs'kyj Ye. Chy'm nebezpechni dlya ukrayinciv rosijs'ki internet-servisy // Gromads'ke radio. 24.07.2016. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: <https://hiromadskeradio.org/programs/rankovahvylya/chym-nebezpechni-dlya-ukrayinciv-rosiyski-internet-servisy>. – Data zvernennya: 03.08.2017.
53. Ploxiy S. Brama Yevropy. Istoriya Ukrayiny vid skifs'ky'ch voyen do nezalezhnosti. – Xarkiv: Klub simejnogo dozvillya, 2016. – 496 s.
54. Portnikov V. Emigratsiya khholodilnikov // Kontrakty. – № 16-17. – 21.04.2008. – S. 18.
55. Radkovecz Yu.I. Oznaky' tehnologij "gibry'dnoyi vijny" v agresy'vny'ch dityax Rosiyi proty' Ukrayiny // Nauka i oborona, 3'2014. – S. 36-42. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: [file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/navio\\_2014\\_3\\_8%20\(1\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/navio_2014_3_8%20(1).pdf). – Data zvernennya: 06.07.2017.
56. Ryabchuk M. Rekonstrukcija regionu // Kry'ty'ka. – # 3-4. – Ly'pen'-serpen', 2010. – S. 9-14.
57. Smolij V., Stepankov V. Ukrayins'ka nacional'na revolyuciya XVIII st. (1648 – 1676 rr.). – K.: Vydavny'chyj dim "Ky'yevo-Mogylyans'ka akademiya", 2009. – 447 s.
58. Sokyrko O. Imper's'ko-rady's'kij feodalizm // Ukrain's'kij ty'zhden'. – № 27 (295). – 5-11.06.2013. – S. 22-23.
59. Stav vidomyj ob'syag zby'tkiv, zavdany'ch biznesu virusom Petya // Finance.ua. 12.07.2017. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: <http://news.finance.ua/ua/news/-/406209/stav-vidomyj-ob'syag-zbytkiv-zavdanyh-biznesu-virusom-petya>. – Data zvernennya: 25.07.2017.
60. Subtel'nyj O. Ukrayina. Istoriya. – Vy'd. 3-tye, dop. i pererob. – K.: Ly'bid', 1993. – 720 s.
61. Ty'nchenko Ya. Ly'she molodi oficery' rady'kal'no zminyaty' Zbrojni sy'ly' Ukrayiny. – Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – # 52 (372). – 26.12.2014-15.01.2016. – S. 12-15.
62. Ty'nchenko Ya. Yak rosijs'ki vijs'ka 23 serpnya zahodyly' na Donbas // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – № 51 (371). – 19-25.12.2014. – S. 12-14.
63. Top-10 najbil'shy'ch kiberratak desyaty'richchya. The Foreign Policy vy'dily'lo 10 najbil'shy'ch kiberratak, za ostani 10 rokiv // Ty'zhden'.ua. – 27 lyutogo 2012. [Elektronnyy resurs]. Rezhim dostupu: <http://tyzhden.ua/News/43416>. – Data zvernennya: 25.07.2017.
64. Traktaty o voyennom iskusstve / Sun-Tszy. U-Tszy; Per. S kit.. predisl. i komment. N.I. Konrada. – M.: OOO «Izdatelstvo AST». Spb.: Terra Fantastica. 2003. – 558 s.
65. Fedoriv, o. Yuriy. Istoriya cerkvy' v Ukrayini. – L'viv: Monasty'r Monaxiv Study'ts'kogo Ustavu – Vydavny'cztvo viddil "Svichado", 2001. – 362 s.
66. Shul'ga N. Drejf na obochy'nu. Dvadcat' let obshhestvenny'ch y'zmenenyj v Ukray'ne. – K.: OOO «Drukarnya "Biznespoligraf"», 2011. – 448 s.
67. Yunusov L. Svyato neposluxu // Ukrayins'kyj ty'zhden'. – # 9 (329). – 28.02-6.03.2014. – S. 26-27.
68. Yakovenko N. Nary's istoriyi seredn'ovichnoyi ta rann'o-modernoyi Ukrayiny. – 4-te vy'd. – K.: Kry'ty'ka, 2009. – 537 s.
69. Cambridge International Dictionary of English. – Cambridge University Press, 2000. – 1774 p.
70. Gen. Carl von Clausewitz. On War. Vol 1 / Translated by Colonel J. J. Graham. – London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd. – New York: E. P. Dutton and Co, 1918. – 314 p. [online]. Accessed: <http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clausewitz-on-war-vol-1>. – Data zvernennya: 21.08.2017.
71. Lt Col Daniel T. Lasica. Strategic Implications of Hybrid War: A Theory of Victory: A Monograph. – AY 2009. – 56 p. [online]. Accessed: [file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/ADA513663%20\(2\).pdf](file:///C:/Users/HIP/Downloads/ADA513663%20(2).pdf). – Data zvernennya: 06.07.2017.
72. Marx K. Revelations of the Diplomatic History of the 18th Century // Marx & Engels. Collected Works. Volume 15. – Lawrence & Wishart, Elektryk Book, 2010. – 807 p. [online]. Accessed: [http://www.hekmatist.com/Marx%20Engles/Marx%20%20Engles%20Collected%20Works%20Volume%2015\\_%20Ka%20-%20Karl%20Marx.pdf](http://www.hekmatist.com/Marx%20Engles/Marx%20%20Engles%20Collected%20Works%20Volume%2015_%20Ka%20-%20Karl%20Marx.pdf). – Data zvernennya: 22.08.2017.
73. Sun Tzu. The Art of War / Translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith. – Oxford University Press. – 150 p. [online]. Accessed: <https://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/1.1/Sun%20Tzu.pdf>. – Data zvernennya: 21.08.2017.

Кучерук М. С.,

к.і.н., доцент, Одеський національний політехнічний університет, [kucheruk@ori.ua](mailto:kucheruk@ori.ua)

Україна, м. Одеса

## ДОЦІЛЬНІСТЬ ВИВЧЕННЯ І ЗАСТОСУВАННЯ ІСТОРИЧНОГО ДОСВІДУ І ВІЙСЬКОВОЇ ДОКТРИНИ СУНЬ-ЦЗИ У ПРОТИСТОЯННІ ІЗ РОСІЙСЬКОЮ ФЕДЕРАЦІЄЮ

Гібридна війна вважається новим типом війни. Але, чи ми дійсно мусимо так вважати? Аналізуючи дії Російської Федерації, спрямовані проти України протягом 2014-2017 рр., авторка помітила, що наш противник користується порадами Сунь-Цзи. Як відомо, трактату «Мистецтво війни» вже більш ніж 2000 років. Якщо ретельно проаналізувати історію Східної Європи, неважко помітити, що Росія завжди застосовувала ті ж самі методи. Немає значення, коли це відбулось – рік назад чи двісті років. Військові методи застосовувалися разом із політичними інтригами, економічним тиском і культурними впливами. У весь час існування імперії, російська стратегія не змінна – це розширення сфер впливу і приєднання нових територій. Тактика вже залежить від обставин. Історичний досвід України, так і Східної Європи в цілому, і аналіз трактату «Мистецтво війни» Сунь-Цзи можуть стати в нагоді у протистоянні із російською загрозою.

**Ключові слова:** війна; гібридна війна; Україна; Російська Федерація.